

Humanitarianism and Spatial Arrangements in Conflict Cities: The Case of Jos, Nigeria, from 2001-2010



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Abstract

The environment around the Jos and Bukuru areas in Plateau State, Nigeria has become one of extensive partitioning due to identity conflicts which have led to the demand for more space. With the displacement and relocation of various parties to different parts of the town, faith-based humanitarian efforts have become polarized. In some cases, this has led to intra-ethnic/religious conflicts. This paper discusses this spatial partitioning and its effects on faith-based humanitarianism in the Jos-Bukuru complex. Looking in detail at initiatives by various faith-based organizations to promote intra-faith and inter-faith acceptance and the establishment of confidence in individuals and among groups of divided communities through the encouragement of trust and the provision of opportunities which will lead to collaboration of people and groups from both sides of the divide.

Keywords: Humanitarianism, Spatial Arrangements, Conflict, Cities, Jos, Nigeria

Introduction

Ethnic and religious violence is usually exacerbated by the desire within polarised groups for space. Space in the context of this work relates to Dung-Gwom and Rikko's (2009) description of the 'Jos-Bukuru complex, where they note that relatively young and emerging cities have a high propensity for partitioning overland, political space and economic opportunity. Jos is one of such relatively new and emerging cities in Nigeria, it is uniquely heterogeneous due to the nature of its emergence as a Tin mining community in the early twentieth century, eliciting various sequences of migration into the area by different peoples; creating settlements based on both identity and social stratifications (Gonyok, 1986).

Although Jos has experienced tremendous growth, residents did not envisage the explosive population growth which occurred from the 1980's. Various factors like the conducive climate and peaceful atmosphere, relative to many towns in Northern Nigeria, heterogeneity and religious tolerance, which gave the area its acceptability; opened up Jos and Bukuru to all. This introduced a variety of communities, each with its desire for 'space' and all seeking various ways to acquire it. Although Jos was relatively peaceful before 1994, this peace was highly negativeⁱ, based on the various perceptions of privilege and authority among the various groups, leading to a series of non-violent to slightly violent conflicts from 1945 (Plotnicov, 1971; Dung-Gwom & Rikko, 2009). The main exception being the 1966 pogrom against the Igbo's before the civil war. However, extremely violent conflicts became rife in 2001, after the September 7th riots. These riotsⁱⁱ were most significant because they, like those of 1966, introduced a process of settlement restructuring in the 'Jos-Bukuru complex'.

This work relates this complication of spatial settlements and its effect(s) on the attempts of Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) at humanitarian intervention during periods of conflict. Conflict in the Jos Plateau and its surroundings has recreated the perspectives and processes of action of FBOs in the area. One major change in these is the increase in the underlying factor of defending the faith, which has been further spurred by more radical and aggressive leaders. These (usually) younger and more appealing leaders have influenced the conflict and have therefore redesigned the nature of their various FBOs to reflect their radical ideologies. As aggression has increased, so has the violence and eventually polarity in spatial settlements too.

Primary among the Faith Based Organizations are the Jama'atu Nasr al-Islam (JNI), the Jama'atu Izalat al-Bid'ah Wa Iqamat al-Sunnah (JIBWIS) and the Federation of Muslim Women's Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), within the Muslim community of Jos and Bukuru. (JNI), and (JIBWIS), cater for and represent the Muslim Umma in general, while (FOMWAN) is an umbrella body for various Muslim women's groups and associations (Garba, 2010). Our primary focus in this work is on the first two. This is because, during the fieldwork, access to Muslim women was quite limited.

For this study, two Christian Based Organizations were chosenⁱⁱⁱ, they are the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), an umbrella body for Christian church denominations, primarily dominated by the protestant (Anglican, evangelical and Pentecostal) groups,

and the Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) Caritas, under the Catholic Church. These Christian groups have shown great difference in the processes by which they have provided and still provide humanitarian relief and peace-building during crisis periods in Jos.

Displacement and (Re)-Settlement After Violent Conflict

As much as possible people congregate to create a community in a space where they feel secure and will expand their territories if the opportunity arises, either through peaceful means or during the course of a violent conflict. Although this desire for space seems understandable, considering that modern society thrives on migration, assimilation, and expansion, the fear of new groups expanding and xenophobia in general, can trigger confrontation and violence, as has occurred in Jos within the last decade and up until now. This quest to hold on to, or gain new frontiers in the "Jos space," has helped create partitions and fault-lines, which although not sharply defined as such, are obvious.

Moreover, these convenient or inconvenient partitions have created another dimension in the conflicts. This we shall phrase as the politics of urban displacement and opportunity. Magaji (2008), in analyzing the frequency of conflict in Kaduna state in the last two decades, observed that there has been a process of residential segregation along religious lines, dividing the city into pre-dominantly Christian or predominantly Muslim areas. There is a similarity to this in Jos, with a slight contrast. While Kaduna city (and in a way the state as a whole) has an incisive partition between its northern and southern parts, geographically cut by the River Kaduna, Jos is partitioned based on what can be described as 'spheres of influence. This means that enclaves are formed within areas termed as enemy territory (Mang, 2004).

Although both cities were similarly created as colonial towns, Jos came about due to Tin mining while Kaduna was created for administrative purposes. Therefore, settlements in Jos were determined by mining activity, while those of Kaduna were determined by administrative structuring and later on, industry (Oculi, nd., Oyadele, 1977). Another interesting relationship between these two towns is the fact that they have been capitals for Faith Based Mobilization, considering that the Headquarters of Faith Based Organizations in Northern Nigeria are either in Kaduna or Jos. The headquarters of the JNI for instance is based in Kaduna. The Catholic Archdiocese of Kaduna is also the largest in the North. Jos on the other hand is the headquarters the JIBWIS and the two largest evangelical churches in Northern Nigeria.

The Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), and the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA). All these faith groups carry with them a large population of Muslims and Christians affiliated to one or two Faith Based Organizations like the Aid Groups of the JNI or JIBWIS, and the Boys Brigade, Girls Brigade and various Christian denominational youth, women or ethnic organizations. The Christian Association of Nigeria has its regional headquarters in Kaduna but also has a very strong presence in Jos. Similar to the other

states in the North of Nigeria, Kaduna and Plateau apart from having similar histories have also had a history of religious balance.

The displacements during the various conflicts in Jos have created two distinct communities within Jos and Bukuru: Muslim dominated communities, having displaced Christians within their midst, and Christian dominated communities having displaced Muslims within their midst. Refuge was sought, either from people of the same ethnic or religious community located in areas assumed to be safe havens, or within camps that were temporarily established and run by neutral and secular humanitarian groups like the Red Cross, Medicines San Frontiers (MSF), or government relief and emergency agencies like the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), with the help of the military or paramilitary personnel.

The former camps are usually located within these spheres of influence, while the latter camps are usually run on public property (usually highly protected by security agents) and take in all casualties or displaced people irrespective of their religious or ethnic affiliations. These new and complicated migration and settlement patterns created by communities and victims of the conflict in the Jos-Bukuru Urban Complex have helped create new enclaves, which have become rallying points for religious and ethnic territorialism. The first major shift was seen in 2001, when Angwan Rogo, one of the focal points of the 2001 crisis, became a completely Muslim territory. One would be tempted to say it was (or is) a Hausa-Fulani territory too, but there are Muslims, from other minority groups like the Baburr and Terra from Gombe and Yobe states, the Kanuri from Borno and Yobe States, the Nupe from Niger state and quite a large number of other minority ethnicities who have both culturally and linguistically adopted the Hausa-Fulani language and way of life; with the younger generation in most cases, completely assimilating the Hausa-Fulani/Muslim livelihood (Winter, 2003; Danfulani & Gaiya, 2006).

Likewise, areas like Angwan Suya to the west of Angwan Rogo began to experience exchanges. Many Christians affected by the 2001 crisis in Angwan Rogo, began to trade houses with Muslims living in areas like Angwan Suya. This pattern developed further in different areas of Jos and Bukuru as the crises further escalated, leading to a large number of communities being re-organized as mainly religious or ethnic based.

Before 2001, although there were Muslim populated communities located within the central areas of Jos, extending to the northern fringes of Bauchi state; there had also existed in most Jos, households within neighbourhoods, of diverse religious persuasions. Muslims living within large Christian communities and vice versa. Even though on a larger scale the areas had bigger Christian populations, there was an acceptable mixture of people. Areas like Tudun Wada, Dogon Karfe, Anglo-Jos and Dadin Kowa had been more highly mixed than other communities, and although the Muslims were in the minority, the larger Christian majority was tolerant. The same could

also be said about the small Christian populations located in the more northerly areas of Jos like Gangare, Bauchi Road, Angwan Rogo, Ali Kazaure and Angwan Rimi. The larger Muslim community in these areas were likewise tolerant of the Christians.

The September 7 2001 conflict, introduced a new dimension in political, religious and spatial relationships. For the first time in Jos, there was a dividing line in some parts of the city, introducing the first partitions in terms of ethnicity and religion. Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rimi, Bauchi Road and Gangare areas had Christians and most indigenous groups leaving by 2004. This period brought to the fore the identity crisis which has been the major factor in the escalation of violent conflict in Jos and Bukuru, leading to further displacement. Therefore, the need for a concerted humanitarian effort by the Faith Based Organizations became inevitable.

Responses of Faith Based Organizations to Conflicts in Jos-Bukuru

During crises, the immediate response to conflict by different FBOs was the opening of enclave churches and mosques as Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps. In most cases, only neutral parties like the Red Cross and National Emergency Management Agency undertook mobile relief operations due to ethno-religious suspicions which saw gangs scrutinizing vehicles in search of 'the enemy' or weapons. The state government relief teams were in most cases disallowed from accessing the Hausa-Fulani and Muslim enclaves, due to the general suspicion by that group of the predominantly Christian government. In cases where the state government delivered relief material to Muslim areas, the relief material was given to leaders of Muslim faith-based groups (Dapoet, 2004; Yusuf, 2008). Similarly, deliveries made to Christian groups by the government were made the same way due to the proliferation of Christian groups and the fear of possible internal conflict that could arise from perceived unequal sharing (Sitdang, 2010).

Muslim Faith Based Organizations and Crises in Jos-Bukuru

As pointed out earlier, Jos is peculiarly unique in terms of religious based organizations. This is because although it is predominantly Christian, some Islamic groups have made Jos their headquarters. JIBWIS^{iv} for instance, has had its headquarters in Jos since 1978. Its growth and expansion within Jos have greatly displaced the previously larger Sufi sects, common throughout most of Northern Nigeria^v. (Best, 1999; Ben-Amara, 2009), The Sufi groups on the other hand, primarily those of the Tijaniyya sect, had been the larger population in Jos, before the 1970's. They had

established themselves as a sort of anti-establishment group, keeping their distance from the more aristocratic Qadiriyya, who were more akin to the lineage of Uthman Dan Fodio. (Loimeier, 1997; Perchenock, 2006)^{vi}.

This growth in the Izala sect and its large presence in Jos have been explained as major reasons for conflict, not in religious terms as in fighting with Christians, but in intra-religious terms which sees the different Muslim sects fighting themselves. The display of contempt in some cases of what the Izala term as un-Islamic tendencies of the Sufis, has led them to partition their mosque and other religious activities, separating them from the other sects. Although through a torturous and difficult, but strong initiative of the JNI, the various sects were able to come together and build the Central Mosque in Jos (Muhammad, nd) describes the relationship between the Izala and other Muslim groups as 'tumultuous. The Muslim community in Jos and the rest of Plateau State is organized under the Umbrella of the JNI, which is a federation of all Muslim organizations, particularly in the northern part of the country. It was established in Nigeria in 1962 due to the growing tensions then, within the large Tijaniyya sect which was developing growing divisions. The JNI was to serve as a means of consorting among the divisions. Its main objectives were:

the provision of a platform for promoting unity and harmony among Muslims; regulating and managing the preaching activities of Muslim groups; and carrying out peacebuilding activities among Muslims and other faiths (Best, 1999).

With this mandate, a larger problem arose with the coming of the non-conformist sects like the Izala. Even before 2001, conflicts arose within the Muslim Umma, over the radical and non-conformist preaching of the Izala because the JNI was not in itself all-powerful, the various other sects found it convenient to go against its wishes. Secondly, successive Islamic preachers in Jos have encouraged Muslims with the wherewithal to build mosques wherever they have settled in good numbers, in order that the religion could spread within Jos. Thus, Muslim scholars, rich individuals, Islamic organisations, and sects, built mosques in various parts of the city^{vii}.

With the trend of building different mosques among the sects, individuals and groups who built and commissioned the mosques, either consciously or not, designated it as theirs, in many cases ascribing administration of the mosque and other responsibilities to themselves. The September 2001 violent conflict, was alleged to have originated from one of such 'rich men's' mosques (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002). This type of mosque's leadership has affected humanitarian aid and relief during conflicts over the last decade.

Moreover, most reliefs outside the Central Mosque went under the authority of imams of the individual mosques, and in most cases, the imam or the patron of the mosque paid allegiance to either one of the JNI or JIBWIS. However, these FBOs did not have complete authority over the everyday goings on in the mosques (Muhammad, nd). Unless these FBOs directly provided humanitarian aid or service to the mosques, and with the permission of its patrons, fair access was usually difficult. This independence of the growing number of mosques in Jos has been a stumbling block for cohesive humanitarian aid provision by the various faith-based groups.

The JNI had experienced serious complications within the predominantly Muslim IDP camps, most of which were created by the large number of mosques who demanded the same provision as others. The problem of falsified numbers of either displaced or wounded people was detected. Most of the mosques that demanded aid initially were based on sect, some sects desiring their self-interest. Although not recorded, Shuaibu (2010) describes a 2001 situation where large amounts of relief material were diverted to certain mosques based on the recognition of either the mosque patron or cleric. Some of these relief materials found their way to groups or individuals who did not necessarily need them as others did. For instance, a conflict arose between some youth of the Tijaniyyu mosque in Bauchi Road, with Izala youth of the Zololo Islamic school, as alleged by the Tijaniyya youth, to be falsely acquiring more rations than others during the crisis in 2001.

The rebuttal made by the youth and clerics of the Izala was that they had been given rations sent to them by their various 'brothers' from outside the state, who were, as they said, 'more committed to their cause' presumably in relation to the Tijaniyya, who were dependent on government support. (Shuaibu, 2010). 'There was' he says ... no respect for what constituted authority during the crisis. Salient antipathies which had preceded and established themselves as the Izala sect began to grow in Plateau state began to become more obvious, the different sects partitioned themselves using their different mosques, introducing a supremacy battle, which had to be resolved by the JNI. (Shuaibu, 2010).

Therefore, 2008 created a difference in the relationship between the various Muslim sects and their aid groups^{viii}. As Plateau state became synonymous with conflict and the violence extended from Jos and its surroundings to areas like Langtang, Quaan Pan and Wase, in the southern parts of the state, the Muslim Umma saw the necessity to chart a new course since there was a realization that the violence due to ethno-religious tensions in the state, was in no way waning. The need arose for the Aid Group of the JNI, to bring under its umbrella other aid groups, especially that of the Izala (Shuaibu, 2010).

This is presumably so because the serious nature of the conflict reoriented the Muslim sect's perceptions into accepting that they had a common enemy, and the intra-religious squabbles would not help during a crisis situation. Although not under one authority, the resolve to unify under the roof of the central mosque (Massalacin Jummaa), brought in a more organized, stronger and efficient first aid, relief and statistical data-gathering process for the dead and wounded.

Even though not permitted to reveal much, Shuaibu (2010) notes, that unlike the previous series of conflicts in Jos, JNI in 2008 was able to organize and help in relief more than at any other time. The organization of the combined first aid groups saw the ability of the Muslim Umma; in providing evidence of what he describes as an "attempted genocide against the Muslim Community in Jos." Picture evidence made available to the author showed that the Central Mosque served as the largest IDP and primary aid centre for Muslims of all sects during the November 2008 crisis.

In 2008, the aid groups of the JNI and JIBWIS in Jos found the potential for cohesion, a trait lacking in previous times. Although unlike the sectional intra-religious violence seen in other states like Bauchi, Kano or Sokoto, where the various groups have been preoccupied with territorial acquisitions, the aid groups in Jos have been relatively more tolerant of each other, more or less because of two things. First is the realisation that their status as the primary FBOs in their spheres of authority can only be upheld if there is a sign of cohesive and mature leadership which could mobilize the Muslim community as one. Second, the various sects to which the different FBOs belonged, have had to come to terms with the harsh but true fact that the crises over the decade have created for them a common enemy.

Christian Faith Based Organizations and Crises in Jos-Bukuru

In the case of the Christian Community in these areas, there has always been a rivalry between the Catholic and the various Protestant groups. To make it worse, the 1980s

saw a new wave of Pentecostalism, which was quite 'suspect' to both the Catholics and Protestants, introducing a new party to the divide. In those times, just like the Muslim sects, the peaceful atmosphere encouraged mainly intra-religious rivalries, with the various churches searching for new frontiers to conquer. Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s individuals and groups encouraged the creation of various faith-based organizations based on fellowship, and in many cases, these groups were directed at missionary activity. This extensive missionary activity which more or less targeted Christians from other denominations was part of the rivalry which had continued to build up within the larger Christian community in Nigeria, Jos and Bukuru not being an exception. Rivalry in Nigerian Christianity (as has been the world over) has had a long history. As Morel (1911) describes the state of Christianity in Nigeria at the beginning of the century, he noted that '...there is the lamentable intolerance displayed by Christian proselytizers towards one another'.

Similar to the Muslim groups, the realization that the crises in Jos were far from over, helped to change perspectives. Churches and faith-based groups, which initially had no pre-planning in cases of crises, started to do so. CAN Plateau State, as a body, found it hard to coordinate a response to humanitarian support due to the sentiments of the various denominations it was composed of. CAN's response to conflict in most parts of the state before 2008, had not been coordinated.

Although in the 2001 crisis CAN distributed food and clothing materials to IDPs in churches used as camps, the organization did not do it cohesively. Funds and support came from various Christian bodies both local and international, and also from individuals and various government structures. The churches and church-based groups affiliated with them made the relief material available to their members only. They also concentrated on gathering statistics of only their members affected by the crises, and in some cases, while distributing the relief material, clergymen were encouraged to "... start the charity from home" instead of noting and dealing with high-priority cases (Sitdang, 2010).

A few foreign FBOs affiliated to some churches supplied financial aid which was to be used in acquiring relief material, but there were allegations of corruption. Part of some of these funds was either diverted for personal use by those facilitating the relief projects or as it were, cases of diversion of the relief material for distribution to favoured groups to the detriment of others (Dapoet, 2004). Some even alleged the commercialization of some of these relief materials. Quite a number of church-based groups had problems with other groups over relief material provided for the people. In cases where some organizations felt cheated, conflict (sometimes violent) arose between rival Christian groups.

In 2001, several church-based relief teams exhibited comradeship, however, aid distributions were done based on the church denomination (Danboyi, 2010). Between 2001 and 2004, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) made no significant contribution towards humanitarian aid, instead CAN made propaganda their main priority. cataloguing various violent conflicts and attributing them to attempts of domination by the Hausa-Fulani and seeking an all-inclusive and broad process of dialogue. Even though CAN seemed to desire interfaith dialogue, it lacked the will. Both Christian and Muslim leaders kept their distance from each other's enclaves, and it became more of an ego trip to call for or to shun an invitation for dialogue. Parties come to see the initiative to seek dialogue as a sign of weakness and also the acceptance of the invitation as out of fear. Best (2008) discusses how CAN organized a reconciliatory meeting between Christians and Muslims at the TEKAN (a Christian FBO) Conference Hall in central Jos, in which 'Muslim attendance was poor, as the few Muslims that came were not opinion leaders'.

Until 2008, Christian faith-based organizations acted individually during crises, through support from sister churches outside Jos, or kind hearted individuals. The targets of the relief from these churches were primarily their members. Apart from the Catholic churches' initiative for inter-faith relations, most other church based humanitarian groups had more commonly been involved in humanitarian efforts based on their territorial spheres of influence. In areas where a particular church denomination dominates, attention was given to adherents of that denomination.

There were cases where doctors were accused by patients of negligence based on religion or denomination. These allegations could be faulted as emotional perceptions, considering the inadequacies of the hospitals and the lack of capacity of the hospitals like the Vom Christian Hospital (COCIN), ECWA Evangel Hospital to treat victims regardless of faith, they served primarily out of ethics, and possibly fault lines of conflict in Jos. Nonetheless, there will always be at all times of violent conflict, a decrease

in the numbers of patients from across the identity and religious divide, in hospitals owned by others. So although medical ethics will call for all patients to be equally treated, common sense dictates the choice of not going to a faith based medical facility if one is not of that faith during a crisis.

An All-Inclusive and Dynamic Approach to Faith Based Humanitarianism: The Catholic Churches Example

The Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN) felt encouraged to create the Catholic Relief Services in 2002 to cater for a broader spectrum of victims during humanitarian crises. Through collaborative networking during emergencies with various faith-based groups. The Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria created between 2002 and 2006 a broad network for emergency relief and peace-building initiatives through its Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC). The JDPC introduced a unique initiative of emergency relief and peace-building in the Jos space called the Emergency Preparedness and Response Team (EPRT) (Sitdang, 2010).

Taking into consideration the partitioned nature of the Jos-Bukuru area, it introduced a multi-religious network comprising its staff and community contact persons (Sitdang,2010; Danboyi, 2010; Gotip, 2010). Unlike old initiatives in which faith-based groups created champions from within their ranks, an act which encouraged nepotism and had no way of checking the excesses or inadequacies of the humanitarian service providers, the JDPC employed men and women of various faiths and denominations. With offices in Jos, Bukuru and Kuru in Jos North and South, the JDPC's network comprises its financiers and supporters (Primarily the Catholic Secretariat).

The staff, which comprises men and women of various faiths and denominations, were so employed to provide easy and convenient access to areas partitioned either ethnically or religiously. Although the Jos office now has a larger number of Christian staff strength than Muslim, plans are in the pipeline to check that (Sitdang.2010). The third group comprises community focal persons. These community focal persons serve as the tip of the network and in reality, are the most important unit of the network (Sitdang, 2010). They take up the major tasks in the network. Their main task is as the end distributors and providers of relief aid during crisis periods. This comprises first aid, emergency services food, water, medicines and basic accessories provided by the JDPC. Their other tasks are to serve as liaisons between the various communities and JDPC during peace-building efforts and the provision of information from the community that can be assessed and serve as either feedback on peace-building initiatives, or as early warning information for conflict prevention.

The EPRT was outstanding in its response to the issues arising from the 2008 Jos crisis, being the most significant of all the FBOs in the field. It first reached out to its network team members to help calm and de-escalate the conflict situations in

their respective positions, being that it had employed both Christians and Muslims, the teams were able to coordinate the network. They identified IDP camps and intervened in the form of relief supplies through heads of households' not camp leaders. They realised that in the camps, conflicts arose when camp leaders or leaders of different faiths were given the responsibility of sharing the supplies. The teams established themselves permanently at identified camps, sharing supplies and providing basic emergencies where possible and using their project vehicles and ambulances in transporting critical cases to secondary health care facilities. IDPs not in camps were also identified and assisted. Funds for material support came from the Catholic Secretariat, Catholic Relief Services, Mennonite Committee and the Kaduna Catholic Arch Diocese (Sitdang, 2010).

The EPRT also made advocacy visits to mosques and churches talking about peace. Due to their inter-religious initiatives, the EPRT, in contrast to other Christian-Based organizations, was widely accepted. This is seen nowhere more than the initiative by the Catholic Bishop of Jos, Ignatius Kaigama, in his co-chairmanship in the state inter-religious council. The Muslim delegation found confidence in the Catholic Bishops' leadership because of the effort seen in the initiative of the EPRT, which transcended religious bounds during the conflict. JDPCs initiative is the only one of such in Plateau state as a whole, which does not just embrace interfaith dialogue, but ensures the provision of humanitarian aid across the divide. This places the JDPC with the likes of secular humanitarian relief organizations such as the Red Cross and MSF. As observed in interviews conducted with some Muslims for this work, the Catholic Church in Plateau state has the potential to raise an extensive peace-building platform due to the acceptance of its initiatives across identity and geographic divides. Unlike the larger umbrella bodies like CAN and JNI, their initiative to encourage employment, relevance and responsibility across these divides has made the Muslim community build more respect for the Catholic Archbishop of Jos than any other religious leader.

Conclusion

Religious groups use mosques and churches as instruments of mobilization for conflict and also as safe havens for their adherents when displacement occurs. A complication in the way humanitarian aid, and services most especially by faith partitioned the towns' social fabric into Christian-Muslim divides. These groups create a lack of trust in interpersonal and communal groups even within similar religious entities. Doctrinal differences manifest; thus, intra/inter-religious cohesion becomes difficult to attain. In certain situations, conflict arose between the two major religions.

The initiative of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria through its Emergency Preparedness and Response Team demonstrated that inter-faith dialogue is possible through confidence building of individuals and groups of divided communities where there is trust. Moreover, where there are fair and equal provisions of humanitarian aid to all groups; the building of a genuine desire for peace by offering jobs, relevance and responsibilities to all community actors of both religions and identity.

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Figure 1: Topographic Map of Jos extending To Bukuru

Figure 2: Urban Extant Map of Jos and Bukuru Metropolis Showing in Various Column, The Growth in Population Between 1975-2013

ⁱ Plotnicov (1967) refers to the Jos Division Annual Report, 1954, which states; "... with its polyglot population (Jos) must always be considered a potential trouble spot" (p.12).

ⁱⁱ The 1966 pogrom, popularly called the Araba riots which took place in Jos, Bukuru and a number of other towns in Northern Nigeria, had a significant impact on settlement patterns, they introduced a displacement which in some cases completely changed the ethnic and religious space of these towns.

ⁱⁱⁱ Jos and Bukuru have a relatively larger Christian population which comprises of a very many denominations. These two have been chosen for the convenience of this study and also because of their significance as Faith Based Humanitarian agencies during crises in Plateau State.

^{iv} Which we will from now on refer to as the Izala

^v Practices like naming ceremonies, celebrating the Maulid (the birthday of the Prophet), visiting tombs of saints, etc. are considered to be non-Islamic by the Izala'.

^{vi} The dominance in terms of the population of both Sufi groups began to diminish in the 1970s and 1980s as the popularity of the Izala grew in Jos. Unlike the Sufis, most especially the Qadiriyya sect, they had resigned from the desire for the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria, their primary concern being the purification of Islam within the domain in which it existed more. Thus, unlike the other sects which held on to the desire for a new caliphate, the already non-conformist, cosmopolitan Muslims of Jos found the new sect conveniently more spiritual in its purification than the mysticism of the Sufi beliefs, thereby accounting for the group's growth and eventual headquartering in Jos.

^{vii} Therefore, the history of mosques gave some members of the community prominence. This prominence even extended to scholarship, even if these people were not scholars, they, out of influence could determine what was happening in the mosque. This attribute was rejected by the Izala, who saw this as a glorification of the rich, or organizations within Islam and this age long tradition was challenged. The major problem with challenging this system was that most of the members of the Izala sect were poor, and many a rich person would at least want to be attributed to either the donating to or outright building of a mosque. In fact, in order to foster that, a number of rich people chose to build the mosques within or close to the vicinity of their houses, bringing in people who would -in a way-adore their wealth.

^{viii} Aid groups, also called Yan Agaji, are established Muslim faith-based organizations which serve as providers of humanitarian aid in times of famine, violent crisis and other periods of trouble. They also serve as security persons for individual mosques and for different clerics as the need may arise. They are designated as the First Aid Group' of either the JNI or JIBWIS.