

Ruling Parties and Nigeria's Democracy: From Primitive Acquisition of Power to Primitive Accumulation of Capital

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Abstract

Nigeria's return to democratic rule since 1999 has seen two political parties rule; the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) for 16 years and the All Progressives Congress (APC) for nearly 9 years. How these parties have accessed political power and the purpose for which it has been deployed have been examined. Based on documentary evidence, elections have served as a conveyor belt to public office for the ruling parties having primitively manipulated the electoral process to gain power and in turn deployed privatization, oil subsidy payments and other forms of malfeasance to accumulate private capital. Democracy is therefore serving the private interest of the ruling class rather than that of the majority of Nigerians who have been assailed by the vicissitudes of deepening poverty and insecurity. The mass mobilization of the electorate is critical to reclaiming the democratic mandate to serve the ends of governance through the efficient and effective delivery of public goods in a democracy.

Keywords: democracy, elections, primitive, accumulation, mobilization

Introduction

Nigeria's two large ruling bourgeoisie political parties since 1999 have emerged as authoritarian democratic institutions. The People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC) triumphed political power through primitive acquisition and then propelled primitive accumulation of capital during their reign as ruling parties. The PDP's sixteen-year rule and APC's eight years have wreck monumental havoc on the country's resources through new forms of accumulation never contemplated by Karl Marx but which represents its alternative perspective as a "continuous phenomenon within the capitalist mode of production" (De Angelis, 1999, p.2).

Marx's original notion of primitive accumulation referred to the process of expropriation of the means of production and a historical necessity for the evolution of capitalism as a mode of production (Marx, 1977). Similarly, Sidel (2015) notes instructively that for capitalist relations to reproduce themselves through the silent compulsion of the market, a phase of primitive accumulation was necessitated which was to commodify land and labour. In addition, an accompanying mechanism was needed, namely the creation of a "reserve army of surplus labour". In the reproduction of capitalist labour relations, a silent compulsion of the market is an extreme necessity generated through a mean, vicious barbarism by a direct application of coercion and violence especially at the infant stage of capitalism and early imperial and colonial eras. Harvey (2003) has stressed the role of primitive accumulation as the basis of capitalist accumulation but to maintain the momentum it must be sustained especially in times of crisis.

The era of globalization as a phenomenal phase in neoliberalism represents primitive accumulation within capitalism in what Harvey (2003) calls “accumulation by dispossession” and this has become the dominant form of accumulation (Bonefeld, 2011). Though a new phase of primitive accumulation, it derives resemblance and strength from the coercive and violent separation of the producers from their means of production; namely, labourers and their labour, turned into a commodity in the market of labour, disposed accumulation has created new markets for reserved labour using privatization of nationalized industries, systematic generation of organized crimes like human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking and thuggery (Bonefeld, 2011). In the criminalized labour markets, commercial sex workers, smuggled victims and trafficked individuals are exploited to accumulate capital. Similarly, the electoral market has commodified the voters’ choice which can be bought and the voter intimidated and exploited for the primitive acquisition of power to facilitate the primitive accumulation of capital.

It is argued here that the primitive acquisition of power by ruling parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic logically constitutes the basis for the reproduction of capitalist social relations by exploiting reserve labour through grabbing by dispossession for primitive accumulation of capital. A reinterpretation of Marx’s primitive accumulation is undertaken as a theoretical basis for explaining how the primitive acquisition of power by the PDP and the APC was achieved. Then the systematic authoritarian primitive accumulation of capital is exposed and tied up in policy options for the Nigerian masses.

Marx’s Primitive Accumulation: A Reinterpretation

Central to Marxists, primitive accumulation is considered a historical phase in the coercive and violent transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production (Bonefield, 2001). Capitalism emerged from the ashes of feudalism by a historical means of primitive accumulation. Marx (1979, p.711) refers to constitutive processes responsible for the divorce of the real producer from labour as the means of production and subsistence. Marx stated that primitive accumulation is the “historical process of discursing...the producer from the means of production”. This process ensures the substantial transformation of "the social means of substance and production into capital" and the instant conversion of "producers to wage labours". Labour as a commodity in the labour market is critical to capital accumulation by way of exploitation and expropriation. Capital accumulation then requires the complete separation of the labourer from all or any property in the means by which the capitalist can obtain their labour. This is how labour is created and by no means forcefully and violently. Marx (1983, p 2072-73) laid bare the constituted force and purpose of primitive accumulation as;

...the process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can engage none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage labourers. The so-called original accumulation, therefore, is nothing other than the historical process of divesting the producer from the means of production. It appears as “original” because it constitutes the pre-historic stage of capital and the mode of production corresponding with it.

This historical phase in the evolution of capitalism enmeshed in extreme coercion would be termed outright robbery by future capitalists of workers' properties. Early

imperial and colonial occupations were characterized by this phase of primitive accumulation symbolized by trading monopolies secured by differing protectionist laws and policies (Mingardi, 2018).

Capitalism evolved from primitive accumulation but once it did, primitive accumulation was quickly replaced by the exploitative system of production. In historical terms, this phenomenon occupied a central place in the transition from feudalism to capitalism (Zarambka, 2002). Luxemburg (1963) wholly accepted the Marxist time-phased primitive accumulation as instrumental to capitalism, an advanced part of the phenomenon however, was the identification of the third leg of the classes involved in the development of capitalism from primitive accumulation that emerged from a two-class Marxian revelation to a third class of peasants and small independent producers as commodity buyers. It was the enforcement of exchange relations among these classes that led to the realization of surplus value essentially translated to capital accumulation (De Angelis, 1999).

Luxembourg's exposition reveals a fundamental contradiction created by the exchange relation that was in clash with the social relations of non-capitalist production. The capitalist resort to military and political violence was to resolve this contradiction (De Angelis, 1999; Sweezy, 1950). This phenomenological advance of primitive accumulation became an inherent and continuous element of contemporary societies to date and would become the basis of global capitalism. Marx had noted earlier about the globalization of capitalism in the formulation that "once this separation of the labourer from his labour is achieved, the production process can only produce it a new, reproduce it, and produce it as

an expanded scale” (Marx, 1983, p. 462). Primitive accumulation was achieved through different forms consistent with the evolution of capitalism. These forms of primitive accumulation included land enclosures in England, slavery and the mechanics of manipulation of money such as public debt, international credit system and taxes (Marx, 1983). Rodney would empirically illustrate how the slave trade was a major source of capital accumulation for Europe and the Americas with the mass movement of African slaves. Contemporary excruciating poverty in the South is inevitably linked to the debt crisis as a mechanism for private capital accumulation for both advanced capitalists in the West and members of the ruling class in the South (Mies, 1986).

From primitive accumulation to capitalist accumulation, capitalism then entered an inevitable crisis phase due to overproduction that was threatened by falling profits. This crisis is a consequence of the “silent compulsion of the market”, a term introduced by Marx to downplay the continuing effect of primitive accumulation. Amin (1974) would reemphasize the reality of time-specific outlining of primitive accumulation but then would further show that it is an inseparable feature of the capitalist accumulation process as it would appear preponderantly in the course of resolution of the crisis of capitalist accumulation especially in the imperialist consequent and domination of foreign territories. The creation of new markets and, the discovery of cheap labour and raw materials was and has remained necessary 'for the resolution of the crisis of accumulation'. In accumulation refining "dispossession and expropriation" captures the surges for the expanded reproduction of dispossessed labour.

Harvey (2003) flexed this dispossession and expropriation in the age of globalization under privatization and organized crimes. It is distinctively clear that the acquisition of power has been achieved in Nigeria through primitive means that have funnelled consequentially primitive accumulation of capital with the consequences of instability and burgeoning poverty. The constant party fragmentation and fractionalization is a logical consequence of the avid desire to access and leverage the means for capital accumulation. The contemporary language, mechanism and forms may have radically changed, but the processes have continued to involve state intervention and the use of extra-economic forces for the primitive accumulation of capital (Shivji, 2005).

Primitive Acquisition of Power and Authoritarian Demagogy

Nigeria's bourgeoisie ruling political parties in the fourth republic; the PDP and the APC strongly believe in capitalism and can use political power to create and guarantee the conditions for capitalist accumulation. This capacity is historically generated with insights from the defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second Republic hence the PDP and the APC rely on social groups' mobilization for the acquisition of political power (Ibrahim, 1988). Both parties generate broad coalitions across different social formations in Nigeria to access political power by primitive means.

In a democracy, elections are the first and most basic indicator at least from a minimalist perspective (Omotola, 2010). Election campaigns in a democracy are then supposed to be a peaceful and open discourse of persuasion. During campaigns, candidates competitively engage the electorate for votes through reasoned arguments through policy options that set them apart. These reasoned positions in canvassing for votes represent

policy options about programs of public goods from which voters then decide on the contenders whose positions resonate with their preferences (Downs, 1957; Bratton, 2008). Election campaigns are therefore taken simply as an arena for ideatic competition for votes through sound persuasion of the potential voter without coercion.

In Africa as much as in Nigeria elections are struggles for access to the resources controlled by the state which represent the most coveted prize in society (Bratton, 2008). Considering the high stakes that election represents, political parties turn to deploy all kinds of means to win elections and occupy public office. During the campaign, voters are confronted by candidates who are incoherent and at best offering non-differing options for the provision of public goods (Mohammed and Nordlund, 2007; Keefer, 2004). The absence of a coherent and persuasive campaign rather descends into personal attacks due largely to a lack of candidate credibility (Keefer, 2004; Van de Walle, 2003). Election campaigns then end up as occasions for parties' mobilization of social formations along identical lines and the manipulation of electoral rules.

Nigeria's fourth republic has witnessed seven rounds of general elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023. One common characteristic of all these elections is the preponderance of irregularities thereby "falling short of meaningful democratization exercise that should be fair, free, participatory, competitive and legitimate" (Omotola, 2008, p.536). The 2023 general elections legitimacy was hanged on the deployment of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and real-time electronic transmission of results to forestall voter fraud and manipulation of results. This was not achieved hence the "process fell far short of what voters desired and deserved" (Green, Mitchell & Twining,

2023). Diamond (2008, p.25) elaborates characterization of meaningful democratic elections are those;

administered by a neutral authority; when the electoral administration is sufficiently competent and resourceful to take specific precautions against fraud; when the police, military and courts treat competing candidates and parties impartially when contenders all have access to the public media when electoral districts and rules do not grossly handicap the opposition;...when the secret of the ballot is protected; when virtually all adults can vote; when procedures for organizing and counting the votes are widely known; and when they are transparent and impartial procedures for resolving election complaints and disputes.

Most if not all these parameters have been undermined during all general elections in Nigeria. It would appear that the extent to which a ruling party perfects the manipulation of electoral rules determines its victory. This then requires the extreme application of unconventional modes of electoral malpractices such as vote buying, electoral violence (Schaffer, 2007; Lindberg, 2003; Lebans, 2006) postponement of elections and declaration of inclusive election. All these mechanics are deployed to expropriate the citizen's right to freedom of choice of electoral preferences (Bratton, 2008). These electoral irregularities are blatantly and brazenly applied during elections by ruling parties to win office at all costs.

Vote buying, a practice deployed by candidates in Nigeria has grown and assumed a pivotal place in Nigeria's electoral process since 1999. The phenomenon has assumed a larger-than-life value in the manipulation of elections and is widely utilized to purchase or compel votes since persuasion seldom generates enough support. As the phenomenon of vote buying overshadowed the governorship election in 2018 in Ekiti and Anambra States,

it became the most formidable and potent strategy in the 2019 General Elections (Genyi, 2019). Following vote buying as a primitive mechanism for winning elections is incontrovertibly illegal is electoral violence in prevalence. While acts of electoral violence were relatively low during the 1999 elections, they were widely deployed in the 2003 and 2007 elections with venom and impunity. Political assassinations before and during elections, hired armed political thugs were deployed by candidates of the ruling PDP in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections to attack opposition candidates, snatch and shift ballot boxes, burn down electoral infrastructure and intimidate voters (Omotola, 2010; HRW, 2007).

The build-up to the 2003 general elections was broiled in fear, anxiety and tension because, unlike the 1999 election, the stakes were higher. There were a lot of manipulations and manoeuvring in the built-up with the clear involvement of the presidency (Omotola, 2010) controlled by the ruling PDP. For example, the order of elections from the lowest to the highest was a hundred degrees reversed to commence with the Presidential to the state Assemblies. The implications of a bandwagon effect were palpable. The result of the elections gave the PDP a landslide victory with the presidency and 75 of the 109 senatorial seats. Omotola (2010 p.546) attributed this victory to;

The power of incumbency enabled it to have substantial and unhindered access to state machinery, including the treasury, mass media, INEC, and the security forces. As the party in power, it also enjoyed good patronage from wealthy and corporate bodies in terms of financial donations in exchange for the protection of their business interests.

The 2007 elections were critical because it was to mark the end of an eight-year two-term constitutional limit for President Olusegun Obasanjo as the candidate of the PDP. Given the rather poor performance of the party in government with high inflation, unemployment, poverty, insecurity and violence, a change of the ruling party was presupposed. However, when President Obasanjo declared the elections "a do-or-die affair" (Adejumboi, 2007) the stage was set for tension. Again, the ruling PDP's victory was a landslide. This victory was achieved through the deployment of primitive mechanisms for electoral manipulation such as "unprecedented rigging, ballot stuffing, falsification of results, intimidation of voters and direct assault on the people" (Omotola, 2010, p.549). The high level of disputation of the election results with 1,250 litigations attests to the non-transparent and unfairness of the elections. Of the three elections since 1999, the 2007 elections would top the chart on electoral irregularities and would be termed flawed even by the winner of the election late President Umaru Yar'Adua. This trend continued in 2019 with 1,689 litigations consisting of 852 pre-election and 807 post-election matters in addition to 30 electoral offences before the courts (Suleiman, 2023). In the build-up to the 2023 elections, 1,241 cases went before the courts for determination as pre-election matters. After the general elections, 1,209 petitions were lodged before Election Petition Tribunals (EPT) including at the Presidential Election Petition Tribunal (PEPT) which entertained three cases (Olokor, 2023). The outcomes of these cases were vigorously challenged at appeals up to the Supreme Court. The sheer number of these litigations affirms the desperation to access public office compelling the resort to illegal means of doing so. The primitivity of the acquisition of politics has sufficiently been well established here in Nigeria by the ruling parties.

The 2011 elections were not markedly different. Indeed, the widespread post-election violence was indicative of the level of frustration and anger that attended the victory by the PDP at the elections. More than 1000 lives were lost making the election the bloodiest (IGG, 2011). The PDP won the election considered to be an improvement over 2007. It lost considerable weight winning only 72 of the 109 Senatorial seats, 260 of the 260 House of Representatives seats and 23 out of 36 governorships. Another major winner was the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) which took away the South-West to become a formidable opposition. Though considered an improvement comparatively, the 2011 elections were not only violent but the polls were also characterized by malpractices, logistical deficiencies and procedural inconsistencies (IGG, 2011). For instance, electoral malfeasance such as ballot snatching, there were minors' names on the voter register, widespread intimidation of voters, and misconduct of INEC officials and politicians were widely reported. To cap it all, the fear and reality of violence abound in a third of the 36 states without arrest and prosecution (HRW, 2011). Again the ruling party though hurt, it still won the election using primitive means.

The 2015 election introduced a new dynamic with the emergence of the APC as a product of a merger between the ACN, ANPP, CPC and a fraction of APGA (Edoh & Genyi, 2017). With an improved electoral atmosphere following limited reforms, the PDP lost the election to the APC (Owen & Usman, 2015). What happened was a balance of terror in which both parties deployed primitive means but the substance of sanity for once allowed votes to count. As a ruling party, the APC presided over the conduct of the 2019 elections. Having benefited from an improved electoral environment Nigeria had hoped that the APC would extend the frontiers of a credible election. However, the reverse was

the case as the party followed the ignominious pattern of its predecessor to garner victory through primitive manipulations.


The APC came to power on the promises of taming corruption, revamping the economy and the improvement of security by vowing to defeat the Boko Haram insurgency. Eight years later corruption remained commonplace, the economy struggled, and the country descended deeper into violence and insecurity. Bandits appear to be on the rampage, especially in the north including President Muhammadu Buhari's home state Katsina. A Pew research conducted in 2018 showed that 72 per cent thought that most politicians were corrupt and only 3999, were satisfied with the country's democracy (Adekoya, 2019). Signs of manipulation appeared with the shifting of the elections as the previous three then followed extreme violence in Kaduna, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Kano, Plateau and Adamawa states. Violence was followed by numerous elections declared inconclusive. It was under this atmosphere including the mass failure of card readers that the APC was declared the winner. This was fuelled by massive vote buying as Bola Tinubu doled out cash (Adekoya, 2019).

A very profound logical implication of the primitive acquisition of power on democracy is the declining trust of Nigerians in their government and the democratic process. Nigeria's democracy is no doubt in trouble as two or three voters do not bother to turn up for elections. Many Nigerians believe after eight rounds of elections that their vote does not count and whoever wins things will remain the same. The declining voter turnout on a steady scale since 2003 empirically suggests that public trust in the electoral process has waned. During the 2019 elections, voter turnout was 35% down from 44% in 2015 and way

down from 54% in 2011 (Adekoya, 2019). The downward slide in voter turnout took a sharp dive in 2023 with only 27 % of the 93.47 million registered voters casting their vote (Hassan & Obe, 2023). President Bola Ahmed Tinubu's mandate is derived from less than 9 million voters, less than 10% of Nigeria's population of 220 million citizens. Another logical expression of primitive acquisition of power.

Percentage of Voter Turnout in Nigeria's General Elections

Voter turnout has been on a steady decline since 2007



Source: INEC; IDEA | Chart: Dataphyte

Primitive Acquisition of Power to Accumulation of Capital

Access to state resources in Nigeria is an intense struggle by political parties and their members and financiers. In a democracy, the electoral process is used and manipulated to gain that access by primitive means such as vote buying and other irregularities. Vote buying represents the primitive creation of the vote as a commodity in the electoral market for the highest bidder which represents an investment of some sort that must be recouped upon gaining public office (Bratton, 2008). The use of violence for intimidation, ballot snatching and stuffing forcefully separates the voter from the vote which symbolizes the choice to be exercised as a right in the electoral competitive space (Agu, 2010). Once the vote is seized by force, the voter is shortchanged in the allocation of public office which

can then be gained primitively and then used for primitive accumulation of capital. In Nigeria, this amounts simply to the distribution of the national cake among members of the ruling and financiers of the party. Different methods are utilized here. In Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the privatization of national assets award of lucrative contracts and allocation of oil blocks with outright misappropriation of national resources are well-known avenues.

The period 1999 - 2007 saw the reactivation of the country's privatization programme initiated in the late 1980s (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). While the whole divestiture process was non-transparent and shrouded in elites' deals, two cases illustrate the primitive allocation of national assets for primitive accumulation of capital. NICON-HILTON one of Nigeria's five-star hotels was cornered by President Obasanjo and his associates as Transcorp Hilton on 21st July 2005 for a paltry \$105m. Manipulation of rules also allowed the new enterprise to acquire 75% of NITEL at US \$ 1.73 billion (Ogah, 2016).

Another privatization case that is a classical expression of the primitive accumulation of capital was the power sector reform. The Power Sector Reform Act of 2005 provided for the unbundling of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) into generation, transmission and distribution companies. A Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was to be created to oversee the assets and liabilities including rights and obligations of employees. A regulatory authority the Nigeria Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was to be established to regulate the entire electricity sector. With the unbundling of NEPA and the creation of PHCN, Plc, 18 new companies emerged consisting of six generation companies (GENCOS), One transmission company (TCN) and Eleven distribution companies (DISCOS). These companies are owned by members of the PDP and their

business associates, financiers of the party with no requisite experience and “little or no capacity at all to manage the country’s electricity sector” (Audu, Paul & Ameh, 2017, p. 1124). The acquisition of these companies by high-network individuals linked to the then-ruling PDP was facilitated by the mobilization of funds from local banks (Sunday, 2013).

Another avenue exploited for the primitive accumulation of capital by the PDP and the APC is oil subsidy payments. Between 2006 and 2011, a total of N3.655 trillion was siphoned through oil majors and other companies linked to party members and their fronts.

Table 1: Oil Subsidy Payments 2006-2011

S/N	COMPANY	AMMOUNT(NBL)
1.	Oando Nig Plc	N22.8.506bl
2.	Integrated Oil & Gas Plc	N30bl
3.	MRS	N224.818bl
4.	Conoil	N37.96bl
5.	ENAK Oil & Gas	N19.684bl
6.	Bovas & Co. Nig. Ltd	N5.685bl
7.	Obat	N85bl
8.	AP	N104.5bl
9.	Folawiyo Oil	N113.3bl
10.	IPMAN Inv. Ltd	N10.9bl
11.	ACON	N24.1bl
12.	Atio Oil	N64.4bl
13.	AMP	N11.4bl
14.	Honey Will	N12.2bl
15.	EMAC Oil	N19.2bl
16.	D. Jones Oil	N14.8bl
17.	Capital Oil	N22.4bl

Source: House of Representatives Committee on Oil & Gas, 2009.

From avenues like oil subsidies, over \$ 182 billion was expropriated between 2000 and 2009 from Nigeria (Punch Editorial, 2013). While data on oil subsidy payments were made public during that period, the APC government having initially declined to pay subsidies, secretly indulged in the same methods without the National Assembly

appropriation, a constitutional breach but which the APC-dominated legislature has failed to take appropriate legislative action against then President Muhammadu Buhari of the APC.

Nigerian politicians swing from one political party to another at will at random with the political fortunes of any party. At the turn of every election politicians perceiving low chances of their party winning elections would then decamp to the ruling party of one most likely to win the election. Cross carpeting has therefore become a strategy for shifting alliances to access opportunities available to members of any ruling party at any given time. Accesses to state resources for primitive accumulation have been entrenching through outright embezzlement. In this regard, hundreds of thousands of Nigerian politicians and their bureaucratic friends have had their hands on the national treasury through various schemes and have therefore been associated with large-scale fraudulent deals. It is for this reason that Transparency International has consistently found Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the World.

Table 2: Transparency International's Ranking of Nigeria

Year	Ranking
2000	1 st
2001	2 nd
2002	2 nd
2003	2 nd
2004	3 rd
2005	8 th
2006	21 st
2007	33 rd

2012	37 th
2013	33 rd
2014	38 th
2015	3 nd
2016	-
2017	39 th
2018	40 th

Source: TI

Prominent politicians like Ali Modu Sheriff who has moved from PDP to APC are named in a N300bl fraud, and Orji Uzor Kalu who joined the APC in 2018 was convicted over a fraud of N25bl (HEDA, 2018). This list of politicians who are members of the two ruling parties in the Fourth Republic associated with malfeasance for primitive accumulation of capital is endless. It is this very malfeasance that is responsible for the deepening of poverty, thus making the country the poverty capital of the world beating India to the first position (HEDA, 2018).

Conclusion

There are incredibly huge benefits associated with attaining public office and it is for this reason that elections in Nigeria are a high-status contest. Elections are intensely contested and then manipulated by politicians to win and recover their investments with no regard for the interest of the electorate who would have been intimidated and estranged from their freedom of choice. Elections are therefore of primary interest to politicians for personal benefits namely primitive accumulation of capital which primitive acquisition of power will logically facilitate. Intimidation and manipulation of results are primitive means for power acquisition in the Fourth Republic. Nigeria's ruling parties; the PDP and the

APC have applied these tactics including assassinations, violence, intimidation with impunity, non-transparent party primaries, and disenfranchisement of voters leading to flawed elections to gain power. Once in power, the privatization programme was politically manipulated to distribute national assets to party members and party financiers as well as their bureaucratic allies. The fraudulent oil subsidy regime was elaborately applied and sustained as well as the elevation of impunity to a virtue to permit the looting of the national treasury for primitive accumulation of capital. Massive mobilization of the population through progressive coalitions is critical to wrenching away the state and re-establishing genuine democracy in Nigeria. The impressive showing at the 2023 presidential elections by the Labour Party (LP) which was boosted by support from the youth and what is left of the middle-class points to this mass mobilization and needs to be sustained through active engagement in the debate on policies of the ruling party through the years leading to the 2027 elections.

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