

REALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PREVENTING WAR.

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Abstract

This study examines whether international organizations can guarantee peace and prevent war through the lenses of realism, internationalism, and collective security. While realism underscores the limitations of institutions in an anarchic system dominated by state interests, internationalism highlights the potential of cooperation and shared norms, and collective security emphasizes deterrence through unity. Case studies such as the League of Nations, the European Union, NATO interventions, and the Russia-Ukraine war illustrate both the successes and failures of international organizations in maintaining peace and order on the global stage. It also looks at the Venezuela and Donald Trump case study in contemporary international relations. The study builds on the collective Security theory as its theoretical framework. The study concluded that international organizations cannot guarantee peace, but they remain indispensable mechanisms for reducing conflict and fostering stability. The study recommended that Nations should strengthen their commitment to multilateral cooperation through established international organizations, such as the United Nations. It is needed for more diplomatic efforts and crisis management mechanisms within these organizations to facilitate collective security initiatives.

Keywords: Realism, Collective Security, International Organizations, Peace and War.

Introduction

The question of whether International Organisations (IO) can guarantee peace and prevent war has long divided scholars and practitioners of international relations. Realism emphasizes the enduring role of power politics, internationalism highlights how law, norms and interdependence enable cooperation that dampens conflict, while collective security proposes credible, shared responses to an aggression against one is met by all. Considers the practical limits and responsibilities of IO in maintaining global peace

(Rawa, 2023). Since the end of World War II, illustrates realism's claim that institutions cannot override state interest when vital security concerns are at stake. Institutions like the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) are examples of an international organization (IO) that is crucial to preventing war and enhancing communication, encouraging collaboration, and fostering confidence and trust, IOs theoretically lower the likelihood of war between belligerents (Mahmood, 2025). However, the ability of IOs to avoid conflict has drawn criticism and mistrust around the globe. Research on IOs and war prevention has taken new and exciting avenues as a result of recent developments in the study of the causes of conflict. These studies draw attention to issues with international and regional organizations, peacekeeping and preventative diplomacy, intrastate and inter conflicts, and the interaction between IOs and domestic institutions.

The United Nations (UN) and other International Organisations (IOs) like North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have made war prevention their primary goal, and for centuries, scholars of international relations have promoted IOs as a way to stop wars. Their preventive abilities have come under fire and suspicion. Perhaps surprisingly, scholarly analysis of how, when, and why IOs sometimes prevent war remains in its developmental stages; however, recent advances in the scholarly study of war's causes have generated new and promising directions in research on IOs and war prevention. The broad adoption of rationalist theories of war has provided a basis for new empirical research on the kinds of institutions, institutional design elements, and political contexts that enable IOs to prevent future conflicts (Edwards & Jonathan, 2018). These highlight the issues of intrastate and interstate wars, IOs and domestic institutions, global and regional organizations, preventive diplomacy, and peacekeeping. They also offer fresh perspectives that both support and contradict research on more conventional ideas like collective security.

Collectively, they demonstrate IOs' ability to not only impose legal restrictions on sovereign states but also to enhance the likelihood of peaceful negotiations between adversarial, self-interested parties in anarchic environments by disseminating information, modifying bargaining ranges, assisting adversaries in expressing their resolve, and exposing or influencing adversaries' preferences. In so doing, these studies have moved the international relations discipline beyond legalistic arguments and abstract theoretical controversies and toward a more systematic, evidence-based understanding of IOs and war prevention in global politics today.

This paper aims to critically examine the interplay between realism and internationalism in collective security, with particular emphasis on the role of international organizations in preventing and managing war.

The paper contributes to the literature by integrating realism, organizational theory, and collective security theory into a single analytical framework. It highlights the tension between power politics and institutional cooperation, offering insights into how international organizations navigate these competing logics. The structure and organization of this work include: Introduction, methodology, theoretical framework, analysis of international organizations in collective security, conclusion, and recommendations.

Research Questions

1. How do international organizations operationalize collective security to prevent war?
2. To what extent does liberal institutionalism explain the effectiveness of international organizations in mitigating conflict?
3. How do organizational structures and decision-making processes influence the capacity of international organizations to enforce collective security?
4. What are the limitations of collective security in the face of realist critiques of international cooperation?

Aims and Objectives

- **Aim:** To critically examine the role of international organizations in preventing war through collective security mechanisms.
- **Objectives:**
 1. To analyse the theoretical underpinnings of collective security in relation to realism and internationalism.
 2. To assess the institutional practices of international organizations in conflict prevention.
 3. To examine the organizational dynamics that shape collective security responses.
 4. To propose recommendations for strengthening collective security frameworks in contemporary international relations.

Methodology

The study adopts a qualitative research design grounded in interpretivist epistemology, which emphasizes understandings the subjective meanings and social

constructions underpinning international relations. Rather than seeking universal laws, the interpretivist approach explores how states and organizations interpret concepts of security, cooperation, war prevention and respond to these frameworks. The interpretivist approach is justified because the research seeks to understand meanings, norms, and institutional practices rather than measure causal variables. Data is drawn from secondary sources, academic publications, institutional reports and historical case studies analyzed through qualitative content analysis. Additional sources consist of reports from International Organisations (IO) like United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and Africa Union (AU) and sub regional organization like ECOWAS. The analytical process used thematic analysis, even though the study does not involve primary data collection or field work, it tries to maintains analytical rigor by triangulating diverse data sources and using theoretically informed interpretive framework.

Theoretical Framework

Liberal Institutionalism Theory

The liberal institutionalism theory is popularized by Woodrow Wilson (1921), John Maynard Keynes, Rober Koahane and Joseph Nye (1977). The theory serves as a foundational lens for understanding how international organizations contribute to global peace and stability. Liberal institutionalism posits that international organizations reduce uncertainty, foster cooperation, and mitigate the anarchic nature of the international system. Institutions provide rules, norms, and mechanisms for dispute resolution, thereby enhancing trust among states. It went further to explains cooperation despite anarchy. In general, liberal internationalism regard violence as the policy of last resort, advocate diplomacy and multilateralism as the most appropriate strategies for states to pursue and tend to champion supranational political structures such as the European Union and international organizations especially the United Nations.

Organizational Theory

The organizational theory is postulated by Frederick W. Taylor, Hanri Fayol, Max Weber, Chester Barnard and Mary Parker Follett. The theory provides insights into the internal workings of international organizations, highlights the internal structures, bureaucratic processes, and decision-making mechanisms of international organizations. It explains how organizational capacity, leadership, and resource allocation affect the ability to implement collective security measures. By applying organizational theory, the study investigates how the organizational design and culture of international institutions impact their ability to respond to and resolve global conflicts.

Collective Security Theory

Collective security is popularized by Woodrow Wilson (1921), Franklin Roosevelt (1945), Graham Evans and Jeffrey (1990). Theory asserts that peace can be maintained when states collectively agree to respond to aggression against any member. It relies on the principle that security is indivisible and that threats to one state are threats to all. However, its effectiveness depends on the willingness of states to subordinate national interests to collective commitments. Building on the principles of collective security, the study examines the theoretical framework that underlies the formation and functioning of international organizations as guarantors of collective peace. It explores how collective security mechanisms, as embodied in the charters of organizations like the United Nations (UN) are designed to deter aggression, prevent conflicts, and respond collectively to threats to international peace and security. The necessary assumption of collective security is simply that wars are likely to occur and that they ought to be prevented.

Conceptual Clarification

This section of the study seeks to provide much clarity to the terms employed and to reduce as much as possible, imprecision that may characterize their usage here. Concepts such as security, collective security, peace, war and international organization are clarified.

Security

Security has to do with freedom from danger or with threats to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests and enhance the wellbeing of its people. Thus, internal security could be seen as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and the corporate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as meet the legitimate aspirations of the people. According to Zabadi (2005), Security refers to a state in which people or things are not exposed to danger of physical or moral aggression, theft, accident or decline. This view is associated with the survival of the state and the preservation of its citizens. In other words, the state has the responsibility for the use of force and power for the safety of its territory and its people. The meaning of security is ambiguous as its scope continues to expand every day; given its cross-cutting and multi-dimensional notion.

Collective Security

The term "collective security" has been cited as a principle of the United Nations, and the League of Nations before that. Immanuel Kant presented this idea in his book towards the end of the 18 century "Perpetual Peace", in which he states that "the law of

nations will be based on one federation of free states (Immanuel, 1991). By employing a system of collective security any member state is dissuaded from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby avoiding conflict. According to Morgenthau (1948) “one for all and all for one is the watchword of collective security.” On the other hand, collective security according to Palmer and Perkins (2007) “it clearly implies collective measure for dealing with threat to peace”. George Schwarzenegger (1962) has defined collective security as machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order”. Ernst Haas (1968). states that “collective security is the technique used by intergovernmental organizations to restrain the use of force among the members.

Peace and War

Hartmann (1973), posits peace and war as ‘by-products’ of the interplay of the national interests of states. “How is state to preserve and/or achieve its vital interests and make itself secure in a world where peace hangs upon the slender thread of sovereign states refraining from taking decisions to go to war?” (Hartmann,1973:15). He went on to argue that peace –like security –is a relative condition in international relations. States will rather seek the attainment of their national interest and self-preservation (security) instead of peace. Though states are secured in the conditions of peace, the necessity to actualize stated interests makes them prefer uncertainties over peace. Fearon, J.D. (1995), see war as a negotiation process between rational nations, as an intriguing one. Fearon explains a fundamental problem in international relations: given the high expense of war, why would logical leaders of rival nations decide to go to war rather than seek less expensive, peaceful means of resolving their differences.

International Organisations

By a way of definition international organizations are groups of nations that collaborate to address global concerns, foster collaboration, and create cross-border norms. They can be either governmental or non-governmental, and their purview includes anything from economic growth and peacekeeping to environmental preservation, health care, and education.

Table 1: Comparative analysis

Approach	Core Assumption	View on International Organisations	Strengths	Weaknesses	Case example
Realism	States are primary actors; world politics is anarchic; survival and power dominate	Organisations are tools of powerful states; they cannot override national interest	Explains why states prioritize sovereignty and military strength; highlights power imbalances	Pessimistic about lasting peace; cooperation is fragile and often temporary	League of Nations (1930s): failed to prevent WWII because major powers such as Germany, Japan ignored collective decisions
Internationalism (Liberalism)	Cooperation is possible; institutions reduce conflict by fostering dialogue, trade and norm	Organisations are platform for diplomacy. Economic interdependence and rule making	Promotes trust, transparency, and peaceful dispute resolution; emphasize shared values	Overly optimistic; assume states will comply even when interest clash	European Union: maintains peace among member states through integration, law and economic interdependence
Collective Security	Security is indivisible; aggression against one is aggression against all	Organization act as guarantors of peace by mobilizing collective action against aggression	Strong deterrent if all members commit; creates a sense of shared responsibility	Success depends on unity' often undermined by selective enforcement or veto powers.	United Nations (Korean War, 1950); UN authorized collective military action against North Korean, showing potential effectiveness

Source: Author's Compilation, 2026

The League of Nations

The first modern organization of sovereign state for collective security was the League of Nations created in (1914-1918) after World War I. However, the idea of the establishment of a body in which the nations of the world could settle their disagreements has been put forth periodically since antiquity. The league of Nations is designed to be universal and devoted to the settlement of disputes and the prevention of war. The League of Nations (1919-1946) failed to prevent WW II. Theoretically, the League was

allowed to use military force, but it did not have an army of its own – so if a country ignored it, in the end, there was nothing the League could do this supporting realist skepticism (Williams, 1927).

EU and Collective Security

The integration of Western Europe after World War II focused on the creation of security communities, especially in the development of the European Community; the current European Union. Thus, Karl Deutsch underlines that, in difference to the inter-war period, the western European countries do not plan wars against each other, but they underline the creation of a security community which is a reality today. The creators of the European Community have made conscious efforts to build a security community in Europe by strengthening the collective identity. The EU project was very ambitious, the path was narrow, and the EU was constantly watched, whatever it did or did not do. As of 2003, the EU has started to project security outside its borders through peace missions, which further contribute to its transformation as a security actor (but these activities have not transformed it into a global actor. European Union (EU) a success story of internationalism in preventing war among members states for over seven decades (Robert, 2003).

United Nations and Collective Security

The UN as the successor of the League of Nations is a collective security system but with certainty created to correct the larger drawbacks of its predecessor. The UN has universal membership and is a universal international organization that forbids war as a means of the international policy of the states. The rule of peaceful solution of disputes, collective actions in cases of jeopardy of international peace and security dominates. The UN (1945- present) is a mixed record success in peace keeping missions (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia) but paralysis in cases involving great powers like Syria and Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine war 2022 to present, illustrate the limits of collective security when a permanent UN security council member is the aggressor (United Nations ,1945).

International Organisation (IO) in Practice and Collective Security Principles at Work

While the theoretical framework discussed explained how different approaches importance are in promoting peace and preventing war. A comparative institutional analysis under provides empirical insight into how these play out in practice

Table 2: Case Studies: Context and Outcome of Collective Security

Cases	Organisation and mechanism	Context and approach	Outcome	Lessons

Korean War (1950-1953)	UN collective security: Council authorized force	North Korea invaded South Korea; UN backed coalition intervened under US leadership	Repelled invasion; armistice without political settlement; high costs	Collective security can deter/roll back aggression when great-power alignment exists and enforcement is credible
Suez Crisis 1956	UN diplomatic pressure and peacekeeping (UNEFI)	UK-France-Israel Attacked Egypt: US-USSR pressured withdrawal; UN deployed peacekeepers	Rapid ceasefire withdrawal; UNEF stabilized borders	Institutions work when major powers converge to restrain allies; peacekeeping can hold a ceasefire
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)	OAS backing; UN diplomacy, security Council forum	US-USSR nuclear standoff; multilateral pressure and UN venue for de-escalation	Peaceful resolution via bilateral deal; UN/OAS legitimized steps	Organisations provide forums and cover for de-escalation; ultimate deal hinged on great-power bargaining
Gulf War (1990-1991)	UN collective security; Chapter VII authorization	Iraq invaded Kuwait; broad coalition enforced UN resolution	Liberation of Kuwait; compliance achieved; regime remained	Clear mandate plus coalition resolve yields decisive outcomes; stopping short of regime change avoided mission creep
Bosnia (1992-1995)	UN peacekeeping; NATO enforcement under UN authority	Ethno-national war; weak early UN mandates; later NATO force compelled compliance	Dayton Accords; violence ended; long-term state-building needed	Light peacekeeping fails amid active combat; credible force and unity among major power are decisive
Kosovo (1999)	NATO intervention without explicit	Risk of mass atrocities; UNSC	Stopped large-scale violence;	When UNSC is blocked,

	UNSC authorization; UNKFOR/UNMIK after	deadlock; post-conflict UN administration	status unresolved for years	coalitions act; legitimacy debates persist but institutions can stabilize after
East Timor (1999)	UN-authorized multinational force; UN transitional administration	Post-referendum violence; Australia-led force under UN mandate	Rapid stabilization; successful transition to independence	Clear consent, regional leadership, and robust mandates enable effective peace enforcement and state-building
Liberia (2003-2018)	ECOWAS/EU support; UNMIL peacekeeping	Civil war; regional body led, UN sustained long mission	Demobilization elections, security reforms; relapse avoided	Regional organizations can bridge gaps; long-duration missions' matter for durable peace
Darfur (2007)	AU-UN hybrid mission (UNAMID)	Genocide risk; host-state resistance; limited mandate	Reduced violence in some areas; no full settlement	Hybrid mission face political constraints; limited force and access cap effectiveness
Ukraine (2014-2022)	UN diplomatic censure; sanctions; NATO deterrence; OSCE monitoring	Interstate aggression; UNSC paralysis via veto; multilevel institutional response	Significant support and deterrence; war persists	Vetoes constrain collective security; institutions shape cost and capabilities but can't end war without great-power shift
Nagorno-Karabakh war (Armenia-Azerbaijan) 2020	OSCE Minsk Group, UN Mediation, ceasefire monitoring	Renewed fighting over disputed territory' Russia brokered ceasefire with limited OSCE/UN involvement	Ceasefire held temporarily; but violence resumed	Collective security weak when regional powers dominate, UN sidelined
Afghanistan withdrawal &	NATO, UN Military withdrawal,	US/NATO ended 20 years mission;	Taliban regained control; instability	Military intervention

Taliban Takeover 2021	humanitarian aid	UN shifted to humanitarian relief	persisted	cannot guarantee peace; humanitarian role of UN critical to post conflict
Russia-Ukraine War, 2024	UN, NATO, EU condemnation sanctions, military aid	Russia invaded Ukraine; UN condemned but security council veto blocked enforcement; NATO/EU coordinated sanctions and military support	War ongoing; NATO strengthened deterrence, UN Paralyzed	UN collective security undermined by veto power; alliances more effective in deterrence
Sudan Conflict (Khartoum & Darfur), 2023	African Union (AU), UN Mediation, humanitarian aid	Civil war erupted between military factions; AU attempted mediation, UN provided aid	Violence persisted, humanitarian crisis deepened	Regional bodies lack enforcement capacity; sovereignty concerns limit intervention
Gaza-Isreal Escalation 2024	UN, Arab League Ceasefire resolutions, diplomatic pressure	Escalation of violence; UN called for ceasefire, Arab League urged restraint	Limited enforcement; conflict continued	Consensus difficult in politicized conflicts; enforcement mechanisms weak
Haiti Political Crisis & Gang Violence 2025	UN, OAS Multinational security mission	Political instability and gang violence escalated; UN authorized mission led by Kenya	Mission deployed, partial stabilization achieved	Collective action possible when states volunteer; highlights importance of regional leadership
Sahel Security Crisis. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 2026	ECOWAS, AU, UN sanction, médiation, humanitarian support	Coups & insurgencies destabilized region; ECOWAS imposed sanctions, AU/UN provide aid	Partial containment; but insurgencies persisted	Regional organizations act decisively but struggle against entrenched insurgencies

Sources: Author's Compilation, 2026.

International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), NATO, and regional bodies like the African (AU) or the European Union (EU) play a vital role in maintaining peace and security, however, while they can promote peace and reduce the likelihood of conflict, they cannot fully guarantee the prevention of wars: Some of the major roles they play includes:

Diplomacy and mediation: Organisations like the UN provide a platform for dialogue and negotiation, helping Nation State resolves disputes peacefully before they are escalating into war. UN’ mediation in conflicts such as Iran-Iraq ceasefire (1988) and also peace talks in South Sudan. In February 2025 the AU convened a “High-level dialogue in Sudan” to coordinate peace efforts among its organs, regional economic communities and mechanisms- aiming to move toward an inclusive political dialogue and a civilian transitional government. Another example is a diplomatic crisis between Algeria and the alliance of Sahel states (AES: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) has triggered calls for swift Africa Union mediation.

Peacekeeping/ Stabilization Missions: The UN deploys peacekeepers to conflict zones to maintain ceasefires and protect civilians such as in Lebanon, the democratic Republic of Congo and Cyprus. Organisations can send or authorize peacekeeping operations to help enforce cease-fires, protect civilians and stabilize conflict zones. The UN characterizes peacekeeping as “multilateralism in action”, helping states transition from war to peace, facilitating cease-fires, rebuilding institutions, protecting civilians. Examples in a case of Mali, the UNs Multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is among the largest UN missions with thousands of personnel deployed in a very difficult environment. The United Nations Peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is still active, reducing tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots since the 1960, its mandate was renewed into 2026. These shows how international organizations provide a buffer, stabilizing presence, which can reduce the chance of immediate war.

International Law and Sanctions: Through bodies like the international court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations Security Council, (UNSC), these organizations uphold international law and impose sanctions on aggressor state.

Collective Security and Deterrence: Alliance such as NATO deter potential aggressors by promising a collective military response, thereby helping to maintain stability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has recently reinforced its Eastern flank- for example, hundreds of Swedish troops joined a multinational brigade in Latvia (2025) to contribute to NATO’s deterrence efforts amid tensions with Russian jets violating Estonia airspace in September 2025 showing operational collective- defense

activity. These efforts illustrate how Organizational ties and joint defense commitments can help prevent wars (or escalate deterrence) in certain regions.

Table 3: Comparative Analysis: Venezuela vs Donald Trump Administration

Dimension	Organisations and Mechanism	Context and Approach	Outcome	Lesson
Realism	U.S. government (White House, Treasury, Pentagon); Venezuelan state apparatus; bilateral alliances with Russian, China and Iran	Trump pursued unilateral sanction, military threats, and recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaido; Venezuela sought survival through alliance and sovereignty claims	Regime survival despite economic collapses; U.S failed to achieve regime change	Power politics dominate; unilateral coercion faces limits in multipolar settings
Internationalism	UN agencies, EU diplomacy, regional blocs (Mercosur, CARICOM); bilateral diplomacy with allies	Venezuela appealed to sympathetic states for legitimacy; Trump's rejected multilateral negotiations, sidelined EU and UN mediation	Diplomatic isolation of Venezuela in western hemisphere, but continued support from Russia and China	Internationalism weakened when major powers bypass institutions; selective alliances replace broad cooperation
Collective Security	United Nations Security Council, Organisation of American State (OAS), inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR)	Venezuela invoked UN charter against U.S intervention; Trump pressed OAS to delegitimize Maduro and activate TIAR mechanism	OAS divided, UN Security Council deadlocked due to Russia? China vetoes; no effective collective action	Collective Security fractured by geopolitical rivalries; institutions lack enforcement capacity against great powers
Legitimacy Discourse	Electoral Council of Venezuela; U.S Congress; international election observers	Venezuela claimed electoral mandate; Trump recognized opposition leader Guaido as interim president	Dual claims of legitimacy created diplomatic stalemate	Legitimacy disputes undermine stability; external recognition cannot substitute domestic consensus
Humanitarian	UNHCR, WHO,	Venezuela faced mass migration	Humanitarian aid politicized; limited	Humanitarian mechanisms

Dimension	Red Cross, NGOs	and humanitarian crisis; U.S framed crisis as justification for intervention	relief due to sanctions and state control	weakened when politicized; neutrality essential for effective aid
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Sources: Author’s Compilation, 2026.

Diplomatic channels were marginalized, with Venezuela relying on selective alliances and Trump rejecting multilateralism. Nicolas Maduro- Donald Trump exemplifies the clash between unilateral realist strategies and the fragile mechanism of international cooperation. It underscores how sovereignty disputes and power politics challenge the effectiveness of collective security in the contemporary global order. This dynamic illustrates the tension between unilateral power projection and the limitations of global governance mechanisms in addressing sovereignty disputes and humanitarian crisis.

The confrontation by United State of America under Donald Trump illustrates the clash between populist authoritarianism and external intervention, raising questions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the limits of U.S power projection in Latin America.

Challenges of International Organisations in Maintaining Peace

Sovereignty and lack of enforcement power: International organizations depend on the cooperation and consent of member states. They cannot for powerful nations to comply with the decisions, as seen in cases like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022), despite UN condemnation.

Political Interest: Major Powers often use their influence to block or shape actions that serve their own interest. For example, veto power in the United Nations security council can paralyze decision-making

Limited Resources: Peacekeeping missions often suffer from insufficient funding, personnel, or equipment, which weakens their effectiveness

Complex causes of war: Many conflicts or war arise from deep-rooted issues such as poverty, nationalism, or ethnic divisions that cannot be solved solely by international intervention

Conclusions

International Organisations (IOs) cannot guarantee peace because of the anarchic nature of the international system and state interests often override collective norms. They play a crucial role in reducing the frequency and intensity of wars by offering platforms for negotiation, enforcing collective security and embedding states in

cooperative framework. However, because of political constraints, state sovereignty and the complex nature of human conflict, they cannot absolutely guarantee peace or prevent all wars. Their success ultimately depends on the commitment and cooperation of nations in a balance of power, and the credibility of the enforcement mechanism.

The article has the following recommendations:

- i. Strengthen international cooperation and political will: international organizations can only be effective if their member states fully support them
- ii. Reform and Empower the United Nations: Reform the UN Security Council to make it more representative (For example, by including permanent seats for regions such as Africa or Latin America
- iii. Provide adequate funding and resources for peace operations: peacekeeping missions often suffer from budget shortfalls, lack of training, or inadequate equipment
- iv. Enhance early warning and conflict prevention systems: invest in data- driven early warning mechanism that can identify potential flashpoints before conflict erupted.
- v. Support regional and local peace initiatives: Regional organizations like African Union, ECOWAS or ASEA are often closer to ground and understand local dynamics better.

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