DUAL DIPLOMACY AND THE NIGERIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS, 1967-1970.

Abstract

This article examines Israel’s involvement in the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) through the perspective of a dual-track foreign policy, characterised by covert support for the secessionist Republic of Biafra along with the maintenance of formal diplomatic relations with the Nigerian Federal Government. Drawing on diplomatic histories, and existing scholarship, the study adopts a qualitative historical approach to analyse the motivations for and consequences of Israel’s actions. It contends that Israel’s policy was shaped by the interaction of humanitarian impulses, domestic political pressures, strategic considerations linked to its wide-ranging effort to counter Arab influence in Africa. The article establishes that its role differed from those of major powers such as Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, which pursued more overt and consistent alignments. Instead, Israel functioned within a space of ambiguity, merging covert military and humanitarian support for Biafra with continued engagement with Nigeria. The study shows that although this approach allowed Israel to exert influence during the conflict, it also contributed to prolonging the war, complicated humanitarian outcomes, and ultimately undermining diplomacy. The findings highlight the limitations of small-state diplomacy in conflict settings, and contributes to expansive debates on foreign intervention, sovereignty, and the role of non-great powers in international relations.