Judiciary and Anti- Corruption Policies in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.60782/j1q4c406Keywords:
judiciary, anti-corruption enforcement, Fourth Republic, Nigeria, principal-agent theory, judicial independence, plea bargaining, whistle-blower protectionAbstract
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has established an extensive anti-corruption framework, but the effectiveness of that framework depends not only on investigative and prosecutorial agencies but also on the judiciary’s ability to process cases fairly, efficiently, and consistently. This paper examines the role of judicial procedures and accountability arrangements in anti-corruption enforcement in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. It applies principal-agent theory to a purposive selection of cases involving trial continuity following judicial elevation, plea bargaining and appellate review, divergent domestic and foreign proceedings, judicial- accountability processes, and whistle-blower protection. The analysis shows that anti-corruption outcomes may be affected by procedural continuity, appellate correction, institutional safeguards governing judicial discipline, and gaps between whistle-blower incentives and protection. The selected cases are not presentedas representative of all Nigerian corruption litigation; rather, they identify institutional vulnerabilities that may weaken timely and legally sustainable outcomes. The paper recommends constitutionally compliant trial-continuity arrangements, transparent judicial-accountability procedures that preserve independence and due process, and statutory whistle-blower protection with clear reward-verification and anti-retaliationmechanisms.