INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY IN NIGERIA’S COUNTERINSURGENCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY

Abstract

This article examines how intelligence failure among Nigerian security agencies shapes strategic diplomacy between insurgent actors and the Nigerian state, and what this reveals for global security. It addresses a core problem in the literature: intelligence failure and strategic diplomacy are often studied separately, with limited analysis of how they interact in concrete counterinsurgency contexts. Drawing on neoclassical realism and perception–misperception theory, the study conceptualises intelligence failure as a structural and cognitive phenomenon rooted in weak state institutions, governance deficits and systematic misjudgements about insurgent capabilities and intentions.​ Methodologically, the article adopts a qualitative, comparative case study design, using secondary sources such as official reports, academic studies, thinktank analyses and credible media accounts to trace how different types of intelligence failure (in collection, analysis, sharing and use) have shaped Nigeria’s counterinsurgency choices and diplomatic engagement with Boko Haram, ISWAP and related actors.​ The findings show that recurrent intelligence failures have narrowed the menu of perceived options for Nigerian decisionmakers, reinforced reactive, forcecentred responses and undermined attempts at dialogue, amnesty and regional cooperation. They also reveal how misperceptions on both state and insurgent sides have contributed to missed opportunities for strategic diplomacy and weakened Nigeria’s contribution to regional and global security governance. The article concludes that improving strategic diplomacy in Nigeria and comparable conflictaffected states requires not only technical reforms of the intelligence cycle, but also broader governance and institutional changes that enhance trust, accountability and the effective use of intelligence in policymaking.